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Abstract—Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are remote-
controlled vehicles capable of flight and are present in a variety
of environments from military operations to domestic enjoyment.
These vehicles are great assets, but just as their pilot can control
them remotely, cyberattacks can be executed in a similar manner.
Cyber attacks on UAVs can bring a plethora of issues to physical
and virtual systems. Such malfunctions are capable of giving an
attacker the ability to steal data, incapacitate the UAV, or hijack
the UAV. To mitigate such attacks, it is necessary to identify
and patch vulnerabilities that may be maliciously exploited. In
this paper, a new UAV vulnerability is explored with related
UAV security practices identified for possible exploitation using
large streams of data sent at specific ports. The more in-depth
model involves strings of data involving FTP-specific keywords
sent to the UAV’s FTP port in the form of a fuzzing test and
launching thousands of packets at other ports on the UAV as well.
During these tests, virtual and physical systems are monitored
extensively to identify specific patterns and vulnerabilities. This
model is applied to a Parrot Bebop 2, which accurately portrays
a UAV that had their network compromised by an attacker and
portrays many lower-end UAV models for domestic use. During
testings, the Parrot Bebop 2 is monitored for degradation in GPS
performance, video speed, the UAV’s reactivity to the pilot, motor
function, and the accuracy of the UAV’s sensor data. All these
points of monitoring give a comprehensive view of the UAV’s
reaction to each individual test. In this paper, countermeasures
to combat the exploitation of this vulnerability will be discussed
as well as possible attacks that can branch from the fuzzing tests.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have
taken their foothold in our society whether it is for domestic
or military use. UAVs are IoT devices that users can pilot
for a multitude of purposes. UAVs have been gaining pop-
ularity specifically in households, where they are becoming
more and more commonplace. While UAVs that are used
by professional cinematographers or military personnel may
have extremely robust security systems, many UAVs made
for consumer purchase are still extremely vulnerable. Many
consumer UAVs have similar vulnerable features, no WPA2
encryption for network security by default, and a free or
open-source mobile application to pilot the UAV. These two
features create a targetable access point for malicious attacks
to be launched upon. Due to such limited cybersecurity put
into many consumer UAVs, there has already been plenty
of research done on the multiple types of exploits that can
be executed for malicious intent. There are three main types
of attacks that an attacker can use on a UAV: data theft,
hijacking, and incapacitation, which are all very dangerous
types of attacks that specifically consumer drones commonly
fall victim to. [1], [2], [3], [4].
The main attribute all of these types of attacks have is
their remote execution. Many drone attacks such as replay,
injection, hijacking, and delay all involve weakening a specific
subsystem. UAVs must manage much more information than
just the user’s input to be a competitive product in the market.
The special features included in many consumer UAVs lead
to more ways that products can be exploited. Many UAV
attacks are based around weakening the GPS system due
to it being on almost all major UAV products. GPS based
attacks also allow the user to control what the UAV sees and
interacts with, giving the attacker direct access to how the
UAV communicates with the world around it. The fuzzing test
talked about in this paper is a GPS based attack as well, and
may be expanded and implemented for the same purposes.
The fuzzing test discussed in this paper was launched
on a Parrot Bebop 2, shown in 1, a drone equipped with
autonomous path settings, GPS navigation, an altimeter, an
accelerometer, and a gyroscope. With a mobile app to control
the drone and no WPA2 encryption on the network, the Parrot
Bebop 2 is a good standard for a household drone. The fuzzing
test involves the exploitation of FTP anonymous and other
weak ports when subjected to fuzzing and flooding attacks.
The model discussed in this paper can also be used to diagnose
other UAVs on the market to see if they fall victim to this
attack in a similar, if not exact, fashion. The attack does not
only expose a way to jam communication with the UAV’s
GPS, but demonstrates new methodologies to launch common
UAV attacks and exploit other IoT devices.
This new vulnerability, discovered through fuzzing tests, is
a clear example of what other methods of cybersecurity need
to implemented in consumer UAVs and other IoT devices.
Maintaining port security and implementing WiFi protocols
such as WPA2, are important measures that can be taken to
combat the exploitation of this vulnerability. For IoT devices
and UAVs these countermeasures can be implemented simply
and effectively fend off attacks. Cybersecurity related counter-
measures that involve how data is managed and processed is
also important when patching this vulnerability. Using basic
computer science strategies to immediately detect malicious
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fuzzing tests. The novel effect of GPS communication being
forcefully terminated is a major security risk and is why such
countermeasures should be used.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Overview of UAV Security
As more devices become integrated with local networks,
the importance of understanding the proper and efficient ways
to secure internet of things (IoT) devices greatens. The basic
operation of UAVs, malicious physical attacks on UAVs,
malicious logical attacks on UAVs, UAV forensics, and secure
communication with UAVs are topics of critical importance
to UAV security. Many UAVs are developed to function
autonomously and in large networks. With this technology
prevalent, advancements in information security need to be
made for the safe operation of large, autonomous UAV net-
works. Current developments in information security for UAVs
involve encryption methods and new network models, but that
barely considers external threats to security.
Before discussing the cybersecurity aspects of UAVs, the
way UAVs operate must be understood. UAVs use GSM
(Global System for Mobile Communication) to maintain net-
work connectivity. UAVs also use UTM platforms, UTM
platforms are unmanned traffic management platforms that
are used to secure low-level operations. UTM platforms work
by pinging the UAV specific commands based on the UAV’s
proximity to the platform. The UTM platform is used for
navigating autonomously, landing, and indicating locations
for specific tasks. Within this network, UAVs must overcome
the challenges of collision, privacy invasion, and information
security intrusion. Seven key components must be exceptional
for UAVs to avoid failing these challenges: Secure pilot
registration, UTM data security, UAV data security, secure data
exchange, secure command transmittance, reliable tracking,
and secure network connectivity. These components are critical
to UAV functionality.
B. Physical Attacks
With an understanding of how a UAV operates, it is worth
discussing how practical operations can be abused, interrupted,
and intercepted by external threats [5] [6]. While many people
fear the idea of logical attacks on UAVs, physical attacks
are also a possibility. Three types of physical attacks that
are used on UAVs are projectiles, interception drones, and
microwave beam jamming. The projectile method involves
expertise sharpshooting or use of missiles; it is not an ideal
method for stealth or when in a public area. The interception
method involves a drone releasing a net or projecting wire to
incapacitate another drone in the area. The final method is only
used by the military and involves the projection of microwave
beams at a UAV to disrupt communication signals. While these
physical attacks are extremely effective their counterparts are
much more common
C. Logical Attacks
Logical attacks are a huge concern with UAVs due to
their prevalence in the IoT [5], [6], [7]. When an IoT device
becomes very common, it leads to shoddier brands with many
vulnerabilities. Many attackers rely on this concept to exploit
UAV security and gather private user information. One exploit
that takes advantage of less expensive UAVs is when a hacker
uses forced signals to target the GPS. This attack only works
with low-cost UAVs that have no application layer encryptions
and no authentication mechanisms. When successful, this gives
the attacker complete control of the UAV’s actions. Another
exploit that only works on commercial UAVs is being able to
hijack video feed by collecting the video fragments on low-
frequency channels and then reconstructing those fragments
into a full video. More expensive UAVs don’t fragment their
video into multiple lower frequency channels. Two attacks that
do affect more expensive UAVs are DoS attacks and replay
attacks. A DoS attack involves flooding all channels of the
UAV, restricting the signal between the pilot and the UAV.
DoS attacks can also be conducted by sending deauthentication
packets on the same Wi-Fi channel. A replay exploit involves
recording commands intercepted from the pilot and UAV’s
communication channel. After the signals have been recorded,
the attacker replays the recording to the UAV to test packets of
data. UAV vulnerabilities can also be exploited by other UAVs
rather than a computer. An organization called Hak5 was able
to use a UAV that could force Parrot AR Drones to fly in
failsafe mode with the tools Pineapple Wi-Fi and BatterPack
installed. Hak5 also developed a UAV that functioned as a
flying Wi-Fi sniffer.
D. Forensics
With every vulnerability exploited there are cyberforensics
analysts that must understand the extent of the attack. Cyber-
forensics with UAVs is no exception, there are many things an
analyst needs to find to understand the source of the issue. If an
analyst is retrieving data after an incident, it is typical to take
a forensic image of the UAV’s SSD. With this forensic image,
an investigator can find what commands were given, what
the UAV was streaming, the GPS location, and the network
communication that took place. This data is stored in logs with
a .dat or .txt file extension. Forensic investigators can also use
real-time tracking to monitor the activity taking place. When a
cyberforensics specialist is tracking a UAV in real-time, sensor
data must be closely monitored. Real-time tracking is done
by connecting to the UAV via Wi-Fi and sending commands
for data dumps and status updates. If monitored with SSH, a
forensic analyzer can get the UAV to dump root files through
the connection. Forensics analyzers also use Telnet to monitor
UAV connections due to Telnet’s ability to send an image of
the root directory. [8], [9]
E. Fuzzing
A UAV’s network security has also been profoundly re-
searched. Many UAVs have unrestricted communication sys-
tems. Services such as FTP, Telnet, and SSH have all been used
Fig. 1. Parrot Bebop 2 drone used for testing
to steal information. Specifically, FTP anonymous has been
exploited on UAVs using FileZilla. Without any proper authen-
tication, an attacker is able to download the entire filesystem of
the UAV’s FTP server which contains flight logs, video, GPS
data, and sensor readings. Such unsecured communication
systems have been victims of numerous exploits. Fuzzing,
floods, and DoS attacks have all been used to exploit the
weaknesses in unsecured communication systems. Floods and
DoS attacks have been used to crash UAVs and steal private
information from users, while fuzzing has been used to cause
erratic behavior in UAVs.
F. IoT Networks
During the entire process of monitoring, exploiting, or
protecting UAVs, a certain level of network security is in-
volved. A secure channel for communication is critical for all
IoT devices. The current structure for many IoT networks is
simplistic and insecure. The current IoT network used is a
network connecting a physical machine with a digital medium
to create data. In the instance of a drone, the drone itself
is the hardware, the embedded Linux or OS is the digital
medium, and the maintenance log is the data created. Between
these exchanges of information, there is very little security and
plenty opportunity for interception and interruption without
proper management and encryption.
III. TESTING METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
A. Hardware and Tools
The new vulnerability discovered involves a fuzzing test
on port 21 of the Parrot Bebop 2. The hardware used for
this testing involved a Parrot Bebop 2 drone and a laptop
with Kali Linux (2019) installed. The tool used to exploit
the UAV’s navigation system was the Metasploit ftp pre post
auxiliary module located under the ”/fuzzing/ftp” directories.
The only alterations made to the code of this module involved
isolating one specific command or a group of special charac-
ters. A fuzzing test also mentioned in this paper is conducted
through a tool called InviteFlood, which is installed on Kali
Linux by default. To run InviteFlood over a series of ports
autonomously, a bash script, as seen in figure 5, is used to
facilitate testing. For more information on the InviteFlood visit
the manual page for in-depth detail about the arguments it
needs.
Fig. 2. The basic structure of an FTP network connection [12]
B. Fuzzing Tests and FTP Anonymous
A fuzzing test is a type of test where a stream of packets is
sent at a machine while the size of the packet is incremented
with the succession of each test [10], [11]. This novel test
uses Metasploit’s ftp pre post module to execute such a test.
A very well known vulnerability of domestic UAVs is that
they allow anonymous FTP. What this means is that anyone is
allowed to log in and begin accessing the UAV’s data. Media
files, flight logs, and internal measurements can all be viewed
without ever entering any credentials. While data is public with
anonymous FTP, most UAV’s don’t allow edits or permission
changes to the data. Although such security restrictions are
typically put in place, the UAV still needs to process the
commands directed toward the FTP server.
C. FTP Commands
The FTP documentation gives further information on how
each FTP command reacts with the UAV and its purpose.
Some commands are straight-forward, like PASS, USER, and
ACCT, that give user credentials or attempt logging in. Others
are much more complicated like CWD, CDUP, and SMNT
that control actions inside the file system. The documentation
identifies four different types of commands that are viable
for this test: User actions, file actions, requests, and memory.
User actions are commands involving the users logging in or
controlling functions from a high level. Commands like USER,
PASS, ACCT, QUIT, REST, REIN, and ABORT all deal with
either a user logging in, canceling, or restarting a specific
action involving data management. File actions are commands
that deal with the directories within the server. CWD, CDUP,
SMNT, DELE, RMD, MKD, PWD, NLST, and RNTO either
access, view, rename or delete files and folders within an FTP
server. Request commands are commands that ask the FTP
server for a specific piece of data. The commands PORT,
PASV, TYPE, STRU, RETR, LIST, NLST, NOOP, SITE, STA-
TUS, and SYST all require the server to respond with either
a message or send specific data about the filesystem or server.
The final type of command is memory commands. Memory
commands allocate space inside the server and request the
server to store items and append stored data with new data.
The commands STOU, APPE, STOR, ALLO, and RETR all
require memory allocation with certain items to be replaced
or combined.
Fig. 3. The two arrays in the Metasploit ftp pre post module with one
containing FTP commands while the other stores special characters
Fig. 4. The enhanced for-loop that is running every combination of commands
and special characters in the Metasploit ftp pre post module
D. Metasploit FTP Fuzzer Module
To understand how these tests are launched, the ftp pre post
module must be understood. The ftp pre post module tradi-
tionally works by sending packets in cycles. The Ruby script
connects to the anonymous FTP service, provided by the
Parrot, and becomes part of a network shown in Fig. 2. It goes
through a list of commands shown in Fig. 3 and then sends
those commands with an increasing packet size in bytes. It
loops through these commands until it reaches the last one. It
will then repeat the same process but with special characters
also included in the packet. The problem with this process
is that it is hard to distinguish if a certain combination of
commands, sizes, and special characters is more effective than
another. To solve this issue the ruby script making up the
module was edited in a way to isolate all elements.
The edited code, on a computer science level, is extremely
basic. Essentially, it is two arrays of strings being looped
through. One array contains multiple FTP commands and the
other has special characters. These arrays are then looped
through, in the form of nested for-loops shown in Fig. 4, to
create the maximum number of combinations. The code will
then send the packet with the specified combination and will
wait until the device responds back. Any major response is
reported back to the user on the terminal. The edits to the code
mainly involve those two arrays. Deleting and adding certain
keywords and special characters to look at the individual
effects of each characteristic. With such edits in place, testing
the specifics of each command and special character became
a much easier process.
FTP Com-
mand
Description of Com-
mand
Basic Range
(Bytes)
Range w/
Special
Characters
(Bytes)
ABOR Aborts a task or oper-
ation
100-10,000 -
PASS Specify the user’s
password for logging
in
100-10,000 -
ACCT Lists user account in-
formation
100-10,000 -
QUIT Closes current con-
nection
100-10,000 -
REST Tells server to prepare
for restart
100-10,000 -
REIN Re-initializes current
connection
7.500-8,500 -
PORT Lists active ports be-
ing used
100-1,000 100-5,000
PASV Begins a service on
port waiting to be
started by the user
100-1,000 100-
10,000
RETR Retrieve a file or value 2,000-3,000 100-
10,000
CWD Change the directory 1-3,000 3,300-
3,750
CDUP Go to previous direc-
tory
2,800 100-1,300
SMNT Mount a different file
system structure on
the UAV
1,000-5,000 -
DELE Delete a file or folder 100-10,000 -
TABLE I
FTP COMMANDS USED IN FUZZING TESTS
E. Testing Overview
To see if two different types of commands made a differ-
ence when fuzzing, two very different commands were tested
ABOR and REIN. ABOR and REIN’s differing functions was
a good way to test if a wide variety of commands would
have an effect during a fuzzing test. The results of each test
are monitored through the Parrot’s mobile application shown
in Fig. 5. Any hints the mobile application gave of critical
services disconnecting were monitored carefully and recorded
accordingly.
ABOR, which is short for abort, is a command that tells
the server to abort a previous FTP command or process.
All data transfer is forced to be shut down and all live
connections involving the transfer of data must be terminated.
REIN is much different, involving the reinitialization of the
current user by terminating the current login. REIN flushes all
account information except to allow any transfer of data still in
progress. This command is typically used immediately before
logging in. Both commands, being very different, showed very
different results. ABOR showed major video obscuration with
packet sizes in the range of 3,000 to 10,000 bytes. The video
obscuration is most noticeable when the drone is moving at
high speeds and the level of obscuration would spike with
special characters like ”%x”. After reaching a packet size
larger than 10,000 bytes no more effects are shown on the
Parrot. REIN showed little to no video obscuration in compar-
(a) Normal display when piloting the Parrot Bebop 2
(b) Pilot view on mobile app when UAV is disconnected
Fig. 5. The blue globe is an indicator that the GPS function is unavailable.
When a fuzzing test occurs, the video feed in [a] will be displayed with [b]’s
blue globe instead
ison to ABOR. Instead, it would block the drone’s GPS from
displaying its location. With packet sizes ranging from 7,500
to 8,500 bytes, the drone would be unable to locate or self-
navigate. The REIN command also drains the battery of the
drone dramatically. Special characters were ineffective since
REIN is a command that never takes any parameters. Both
commands did have one outcome in common, the motors of
the UAV losing control. This symptom, the video obscuration,
and the battery losing power rapidly all appear when the test is
launched during flight. As the UAV loses control of its motors
and begins swirling downwards, the video feed will break into
static or be extremely delayed, and the UAV’s battery, in some
cases, will drain in a matter of minutes. Such symptoms would
incapacitate a user’s ability to pilot the UAV effectively and
is a clear threat. All of these effects, while effective in taking
down the UAV, are results of an overflow attack. The UAV
is unable to handle such large streams of data so quickly and
begins draining power from other resources and puts less effort
in other processes. This explains the drain in battery power,
the video feed cutting, and the functionality of the motors
declining.
The more interesting, and novel, effect is the GPS cutting
out. With specific commands and special characters, it was
possible to consistently have the Parrot lose its GPS signal.
This typically involves fuzzing the drone with an FTP com-
mand that deals with file-based operations such as changing
directories or retrieving data. The first thing known about these
incidences is that they are not overflow attacks in terms of the
size of the packets. This is proven by a test resulting in the
GPS to cut out on a packet with a size of 100 bytes when
the command CWD or CDUP was used with the ”/” special
character. The packet size is too small for the Parrot to be
overloaded. As for when there are large streams of data, the
tests become slightly harder to monitor. The size may not be at
a level for an overflow attack to occur, but the UAV will clearly
process and accept packets that don’t fit within the parameters
of the command. This prolongs the lack of GPS functionality
extensively and can lead to certain commands going past the
UAV, or crashing the drone entirely. Certain commands have
also been tested with specific triggering parameters used. In
such a test case there were only a couple packets that didn’t fit
the normal parameters accepted. Not only were the incorrect
parameters overrun easily, but the range at which the GPS
would cut out varied differently than when the command was
sent without any special characters.
An important fact to know about this GPS cut out test is
that each command behaves differently. Each command used
in the test will vary in terms of what size the packets must
be to be effective, the best complementing special characters,
the longevity of the effects, the consistency of the effects,
and any extraneous effects the UAV displays. Many of these
differences have to deal with security features hard-coded into
the Parrot. For instance, if a developer knows the range of
sizes for a proper packet of data regarding a command, then
the developer can set a minimum and maximum limit for
the size of the packet to be before processing. This means
if a packet is sent and is above or below the limit, the UAV
will automatically reject that piece of data and won’t bother
processing it. The ranges will also change depending on if
there is a parameter, or special character in this case, that is
called in conjunction with the command. These limits don’t
just affect how large a packet of data can be. As mentioned
before, the autonomous FTP service on most UAVs doesn’t
allow the filesystem to be edited. This means that as soon as
a restricted process is detected by the server, the request will
immediately be rejected. What testing has shown, however,
is that the FTP server will process what the command is
requesting in its entirety before deciding if such an action
is permissible and should be rejected.
F. User Action Commands
The first group of commands worked on when studying this
novel GPS test, were the user actions. With exception of one
command, most user actions had limited to no effects on the
UAV’s functionality. Commands that involved logging in the
user or terminating processes such as USER, PASS, ACCT,
QUIT, and REST would either terminate the connection with
the FTP server or have negligible effects. The only exception
to this group of commands when testing was REIN. REIN’s
success compared to the other commands in its family is
credited to the fact that REIN doesn’t involve logging in the
user nor does it disrupt any current processes running on the
UAV. What makes REIN a very interesting command, is that
it can stack the same request over and over for the UAV to
execute without affecting the current request being handled.
REIN, although showing quite minimal video obscuration, was
capable of disrupting the GPS signal when packet size was in
the range of 7,500 to 8,500 bytes. REIN was also able to
quickly drain the battery of the UAV in a matter of 5 minutes
when all the packets sent followed the UAV’s configured
packet size range. REIN isn’t used with any set of parameters,
which is why special characters made no difference while
testing.
G. Request Memory Commands
The next tested group of commands was the request and
memory commands due to their similarity. The memory com-
mand RETR and the request commands PORT and PASV were
three diverse commands that could fairly represent the less
common commands used. The memory command, RETR is an
abbreviation of the word retrieve. The RETR command takes a
parameter of a pathname and then retrieves the data located in
that path name for the user. The RETR command can also
be used in conjunction with the other memory commands
and the REST command. The command’s main purpose is
to transfer a copy of a specified file while leaving the status
of the file unchanged. PORT is a command that retrieves what
port should be used in a data connection. The command will
list the defaults for both the user and server in the form of a
concatenated 32-bit internet host address and 16-bit TCP port
address. PORT will also accept parameters with the intention
to give more information on a specific user, server, or port
number. The PASV command, which differs greatly from the
PORT command, requests the server to listen on data port. The
port the server listens to is not the default data port, and the
server must wait on that port until a connection is requested
by a user. The PASV command also outputs the host and port
address being listened on. Similar to the PORT and RETR
command, the PASV command also takes a parameter and in
this case, it is used to specify what port to listen on.
1) RETR Command: The RETR command was the first
command tested to be more effective when parameters were
used. With a packet size range of 2,000 to 3,000 bytes, the
RETR command can cause GPS failure on its own. When used
with non-alphabetic parameters, such as %x, %s, %d, or %n,
the GPS function could crash at almost any range, giving the
RETR command a much wider range for testing. These results
most likely have to do with how the FTP command is storing
these special characters. When it tries processing what the
command is specifically looking for it is unable to handle the
unknown character and begins pulling power away from other
subsystems to process this request. When these similar RETR
commands are sent to the UAV constantly, the GPS subsystem
loses all power entirely. When looping through the entire array
of special characters, the RETR command shuts down the
GPS if special characters such as %x, %s, or $,ˆ are used as
parameters. However, the effects would immediately dissipate
when alphabetic or file system characters were utilized. The
reason for a dramatic change in the UAV’s behavior is because
alphabetic and file system characters are normal parameters for
the RETR and are easy to process relative to the other special
characters.
2) PASV Command: The tests with the PASV command
shows how requests that require large amounts of computation
fair in fuzzing tests. PASV, by itself, can take down the Parrot’s
GPS functionality when the size is in the range from 100
to 1,000 bytes. When parsing through the array of special
characters, the PASV test began shutting down the Parrot’s
GPS communication after the set of ”%”-related characters.
Other special characters had the same results, and the test
continued until a much later special character in the list was
used. Due to there being no uniqueness with the special
character causing the test to end, this test’s longevity has
to do with how the UAV manages the PASV request. The
documentation of the PASV command specifies that the server
must wait for a connection on a specific server. Since this
command is allowed to be called by the user and takes a
numerical parameter, the Parrot will process and run the PASV
command every time. With so many requests piling on top
of each other, the Parrot is forced to put all of its resources
towards the incoming flow of packets. This leads to a delay
which allows valid requests to be ignored or skipped while
the Parrot is trying to catch up. Such a test has a possibility
to allow a more malicious command to be processed by the
Parrot without proper authentication.
3) PORT Command: The PORT command, similar to
RETR, would shut down the Parrot’s GPS when the special
characters %s, %d, %n, %x, or %p were inputted. Unlike the
RETR, the PORT command only affected the Parrot’s GPS
when special characters starting with ”%” were used. The
GPS was only incapacitated for a relatively short amount of
time and had minimal effects on the Parrot’s general behavior.
Compared to the processes demanded by PASV and RETR,
PORT doesn’t require much computational work for the UAV
and explains why it isn’t as effective as PASV or RETR.
H. File Action Commands
The final, and most effective, group of commands tested
were file actions. The file actions CWD, CDUP, SMNT, and
DELE were all tested on the Parrot through the ftp pre post
module. The CWD command, or change working directory
command, allows the user to work with a different directory
or dataset. The argument for this command is a pathname
specifying a directory to transfer to. The CDUP command is
a special case of CWD, which allows the user to move up the
filesystem tree and makes folder navigation much easier. The
SMNT command, which stands for structure mount command,
allows the user to mount a file system or data structure onto
the current branch. The parameter this command takes is the
file system or directory that is going to be mounted. SMNT,
unlike CWD and CDUP, isn’t permitted with anonymous FTP
due to it altering the data in the file system, rather than altering
how the file system is viewed. The DELE, like SMNT, isn’t
allowed to be executed by the user with anonymous FTP. The
DELE command allows the user to delete a file or directory
with the parameter being the name of a file or pathname.
1) CMD Command: CWD was the first of the file action
commands tested on the Parrot. CWD shows minimal video
distortion when part of testing. Without any parameters, CWD
is able to block the Parrot’s GPS connection when the size
of the packets reaches 3,000 bytes. While the longevity of
the test is based on how the long the test goes on for, it is
relevant to mention that the effects of the test will immediately
dissipate once the test is terminated. When parameters are
used, however, CWD begins to act similarly to the PASV
command. CWD, like the PASV command, is permitted with
anonymous FTP and is therefore processed and attempted.
This means that when parameters are present, the delay seen
with the PASV command is seen once again. CWD will begin
to cut out immediately with parameters involving a ”/”. To
further test the delay and ignoring of the command, invalid ”/”-
related parameters were inputted while the test was running.
With a range of packet sizes from 3,300 to 3,750 bytes, the
invalid character and imaginary directories put as parameters
would be processed and accepted by the UAV just as any other
parameter would. This delay would happen after the test had
been running for about 5 to 10 seconds and is a promising
place for even more sophisticated exploits.
2) CDUP Command: CDUP, being so closely related to
CWD behaved similarly. The GPS on the Parrot began to
cut out with a packet size of 2,800 bytes. With parameters
involving ”/”, the GPS would cut out at different ranges
intermittently. From 100 to 300 bytes there are brief losses of
GPS connection, from 700 to 1,100 bytes there is a continuous
loss of GPS signals, and the same occurs with packets ranging
in sizes from 1,200 bytes to 1,300 bytes. CDUP also showed
the same delay characteristic as CWD. CDUP, after running
the test for 5 to 10 seconds, will take invalid parameters
and still force the Parrot to lose GPS connection. After the
test is launched with CDUP or CWD, the Parrot has issues
establishing a GPS connection which implies that both tests
leave a long impact on the Parrot’s system.
3) SMNT and DELE Command: SMNT and DELE were
both not as effective as CWD or CDUP but still demonstrated
some interesting symptoms. Unlike the CDUP and CWD
command, both the SMNT and DELE command had no
dramatic improvements when tested with special characters.
SMNT was able to block all GPS connections when the packet
size was in the range of 1,000 bytes to 5,000 bytes. SMNT
also causes the Parrot to have difficulty establishing a GPS
connection. The DELE command, being a simple request that
requires little computation and is not permitted by anonymous
FTP, showed little effect on the Parrot’s behavior. There was
intermediate video obscuration but the UAV’s GPS connection
remained consistent and strong.
I. Flight Testing
It is important to know that all the previous tests mentioned
were done while the Parrot was not flying. The Parrot was
online, operational, and in its landed state. The reason for this
is because the Parrot treats network traffic differently when it is
in flight compared to it being landed. Due to security measures
Fig. 6. The bash script used to automate the InviteFlood fuzzing test on the
Parrot Bebop 2
implemented on the Parrot Bebop 2, any network traffic that
isn’t part of flying, is never executed. This means that although
every FTP command will be processed, the Parrot will refuse
to drain resources from subsystems critical to flight such as
GPS navigation. Surprisingly, the Parrot will not try to regain
GPS navigation if lost before take off. When the previously
mentioned tests are launched before the Parrot has taken off,
the GPS function of the UAV will remain unavailable for the
entirety of the flight. The loss of GPS navigation as a feature
may stay until the UAV is restarted with s utilizing effective
commands like CWD, CDUP, and REIN. If the test is launched
during the UAV’s fight, however, the GPS connection will
remain but other subsystems of the Parrot will begin to fail.
Video obscuration becomes much more apparent, delay in the
GPS updating the Parrot’s position becomes frequent, motor
speeds begin to change randomly, the charge in the Parrot’s
battery drains quickly, and pilot input becomes slightly delayed
or entirely ignored at certain points of the flight. There was
also a direct correlation seen between commands that were
effective at eliminating GPS navigation and commands causing
other subsystems to fail during flight.
J. General Fuzzing Tests
To see if this novel and dangerous test is isolated to purely
FTP anonymous, a series of tests were conducted with a tool
called InviteFlood. InviteFlood is a tool that will flood session
initiation protocol (SIP) packets and session description proto-
col (SDP) packets to any device at any port. To see if fuzzing
other ports would cause GPS communication to shut down,
a bash script shown in Fig. 6 was set up to call InviteFlood
to fuzz a series of ports. 20,000 packets would be launched
at ports 1 to 100. Low port numbers were targeted due to
their popularity in data transmission. Many common network
protocols use low port numbers making the range from 1 to
100 a good set of ports to test. Symptoms seen by the fuzzing
tests, such as the charge in the battery dropping and motor
speed irregularity was common. The loss of GPS navigation,
however, was only seen in a specific range of ports. Ports 14 to
27 showed a loss of GPS connection when fuzzed, as well as
ports 48 to 65. This indicates that other services running on the
Parrot can be further exploited by fuzzing specific commands
as well. This discovery also demonstrates how dangerous it
can be to have unsecured ports on a UAV or any IoT device.
K. Specifics of Fuzzing Tests
While the termination of GPS signals on any IoT device
is a serious vulnerability, the specifics of how the termination
behaved is what makes this novel test so perilous. The test
is executed quickly. As soon as a certain packet size was
reached or a triggering special character was used, the effects
of the tests were immediate. The longevity of the test is
concerning in regards to the security of IoT devices. As
mentioned previously, CDUP showed connectivity issues after
the termination of the test. If launched before the flight of
the UAV, the GPS signals would remain terminated for the
entirety of flight. Such quick execution and dramatic longevity
are dangerous threats to IoT device security and especially the
functionality of UAVs.
IV. IDENTIFIED VULNERABILITIES
The most advantageous attribute of this fuzzing test is that
it exposes a plethora of new vulnerabilities. This fuzzing test
not only shows the security risk of unsecured FTP anonymous
but how exploited insecure ports can weaken the subsystems of
UAVs. Many domestic UAVs sold at stores fall victim to even
more vulnerabilities than the Parrot Bebop 2 used for testing.
For that reason, it is necessary to not only diagnose how this
test can be used in similarly secured UAVs but other, unsecured
models of UAVs available to the public. UAVs with WPA2
encryption aren’t safe either. Having a weak password can
make secure UAVs susceptible to this test. The most dangerous
aspect of this test is the wide variety of effects it has.
A. Video Obscuration
The most noticeable and debilitating effect brought by
fuzzing tests is video obscuration. When navigating complex
environments that are rapidly changing, the UAV’s vision is
the best way to navigate an area. The UAV’s video feed is
especially useful when navigating a location far away from
the pilot. When the only source of knowledge regarding your
exact location is camera feed, the disruption of that camera
feed becomes a major issue. What’s even more unfortunate is
that if a fuzzing test causes the delay of the video feed, the
pilot may not be able to tell if what they are seeing is still
relevant. When many UAV’s lose connection with a certain
subsystem, they’ll display what the last signal informed the
UAV. While this can mean the GPS will take a while to
update, it can also be as serious as the video feed freezing
entirely or giving a misleading perspective. With so much
information restricted from the pilot due to a fuzzing test,
crashing can seem inevitable. The other crucial detail about
this test is that it isn’t necessarily specific to UAVs. Other IoT
devices can be victims of this fuzzing test. Security cameras,
automated vehicles, and vision-based sensors would all be
directly affected by a fuzzing test of this magnitude.
B. Battery Draining Attacks
Video obscuration isn’t the only symptom recorded of a
fuzzing test on a UAV. The extremely quick drop in battery
charge is a very concerning side effect as well. The most likely
cause of this swift drop in power is the amount of computation
needed to handle all of those requests. While managing an
FTP server’s constant requests may be easy on its own, the
Parrot is processing a lot more at the same time. The motors,
video streaming, GPS navigation, and connection with the
pilot all have to be powered at the same time these requests
are being flooded thought the UAV’s system. The other factor
that makes this effect have such a great impact, is that many
of the other symptoms of fuzzing and flooding a UAV become
more dramatic when the battery level is lower. That means the
more the battery is drained, the more susceptible the UAV is
to other attacks. Just like video obscuration, the sharp drain
of battery power could be used against other IoT devices.
Security systems, remote-controlled vehicles, and other IoT
devices that run solely on battery power may be at risk.
C. Delay in User Input and Hardware
While uneven motor speed and a delay when controlling
the Parrot are problems more specific to UAVs, it is still a
notable effect of a fuzzing test. The fuzzing test being able to
affect the Parrot’s hardware means that there is a possibility of
other IoT devices having their hardware malfunction as well.
The slow reaction to user input is also a major issue with
many IoT devices that are controlled and managed remotely.
Both of these effects would be disastrous for remotely operated
machinery. It is possible that being able to control specific
malfunctions in the hardware, combined with the ability to
limit user interaction with the UAV, could lead to a type of
replay attack. The hacker would learn what type of data makes
the UAV swerve one way or another and can eventually create
a program to steer the UAV remotely while the original user
is blocked off. This type of replay attack, if implemented,
would be an extremely effective way to hijack a UAV or other
remotely operated vehicles.
D. GPS Elimination
The most novel part of the fuzzing test is the elimination
of GPS navigation. While this effect is based on the time
the test is launched and what state the UAV it can lead to
even more perilous attacks. A feature that many commercial
UAVs possess is an autonomous flight feature. This works by
generating a flight path for the UAV to follow. For such an
operation to work properly, GPS needs to constantly update
the UAV’s position and maintain a strong connection with the
UAV. [13][6] If this test were to be launched on UAV planning
to take an autonomous flight, malfunctions would incessantly
plague the operation. Not only does this test prevent an
autonomous flight to take place, but it also gives an attacker
direct access to the UAV’s GPS subsystem. It is then feasible
for an attacker to send false GPS data, that the UAV would
trust and follow. Giving the UAV specific locations as GPS
data would be another way to launch a replay attack and
eventually hijack the UAV. It is also possible that once GPS
navigation fails as the UAV begins to launch, that the attacker
will now have direct input into the UAV. This could allow
the attacker to steal the images and video collected on the
UAV, or control other aspects of the UAV. Deleting critical files
from the UAV’s file system, injecting malware to collect more
information, or manipulating the UAV’s network connections
are all legitimate attacks that could be subjected to a UAV
based on this fuzzing test.
Without the proper security protocols in place, many com-
mercial UAVs will fall victim to this test. The more com-
munication systems and processes managed by a UAV, the
more likely a fuzzing test would be able to exploit this
vulnerability. Many other domestic UAVs use SSH or Telnet as
their primary communication subsystem and can be exploited
in the same fashion. Using SSH specific commands or Telnet
specific commands could have even greater implications due
to limited security measures taken. Although there are many
different respective models of UAVs, an unsecured way to
communicate with that UAV, whether it is through FTP, Telnet,
or SSH doesn’t make a difference in terms of this test. The
cybersecurity of commercial UAVs and IoT devices are at
risk of this kind of fuzzing test without the proper security
measures taken to defend them. [14]
E. User Protection
Unsecured UAV’s and other IoT devices aren’t the only
possible victims of this fuzzing test. A device’s security is only
stable when a user follows proper protocol when maintaining
its security. Users securing their data with simplistic passwords
that can be easily cracked are just as vulnerable as unsecured
UAVs. Many people aren’t aware of how much data a hacker
can obtain from an IoT device. A hacker can break into a
UAV’s network wouldn’t just have the opportunity to attack the
UAV, but the original pilot of the UAV. The fuzzing test could
be used to weaken the secure connection between the UAV and
the user and allow for the interception of private information
that can be used for later, malicious purposes [8], [9]. UAV
security isn’t just about securing UAVs, it’s much more than
that. This fuzzing test exposes a point of weakness that
could be used to infiltrate a much larger network. Exploiting
the vulnerabilities of unsecured FTP, SSH, Telnet, and other
communication services used by UAVs is a major security
risk in the IoT world. Such a large risk is what makes this
discovery such a critical topic to continue research in.
F. Diagnosing IoT Devices
The confirm if this fuzzing test has the same results on
other UAVs or IoT devices is very simple. A packet flooding
tool like InviteFlood is being used, flooding packets to ports
1 to 100, may be the quickest way to see if a device is
vulnerable to this test. For UAVs, launch the test two times.
Once when it is in its landed state and once when it is in flight.
If abnormalities occur, then there is a reason to investigate the
services located on those ports. To look at specific services or
open ports scan the device with Nmap, as seen with Fig. 7, or
manage its network traffic with a packet sniffer. Once an open
service is found, look into that service’s specific keywords
and commands that can be sent in a fuzzing test. Launch
a fuzzing test with commands that show a high possibility
Fig. 7. Nmap quickly identifying anonymous FTP service on Parrot
of overwhelming the UAV. Commands that require a large
amount of computation and take a wide variety of arguments
are optimal.
V. PROPOSED COUNTERMEASURES
With IoT being a relatively young and new expansive addi-
tion to our lives, the general lack of cybersecurity with many
IoT devices is extremely alarming. With security systems
connected to mobile devices, personal assistants constantly
listening in people’s homes, and simple devices such as
refrigerators and thermostats connected to the internet, it is
no wonder why the IoT has become such a pertinent matter
regarding cybersecurity. UAV’s are no exception.
Although the aforementioned test is effective, simple coun-
termeasures can be implemented to either prevent or limit
the extent of this test. All of these countermeasures involve
changing the software of the UAV, which developers can
implement quickly and efficiently. WPA2 encryption, extensive
soft limits, port management, and dynamic security protocols
are all ways UAVs can be defended from this test.
A. WPA2 Encryption
WPA2 encryption is the strongest line of security for all
UAVs. UAVs are essentially flying access points. They gener-
ate their own network with the user and UAV at its core. With-
out WPA2 encryption, the secure connection between the UAV
and the user is exposed to hackers. One strategy UAVs use as a
security measure is to allow only phones to make a connection.
While this may be a valid form of prevention for script kiddies,
it is not completely secure. Tools like macchanger are capable
of changing a computer’s MAC address to any custom MAC
address the attacker wants. Macchanger gives the attacker the
ability to mask their computer as any mobile device. For that
reason, WPA2 encryption is a necessary security measure to
implement in commercial UAVs. The UAV that the fuzzing
test was launched on, a Parrot Bebop 2, didn’t have WPA2
encryption and is the reason why this vulnerability was so
much easier to exploit. Of course, WPA2 encryption is only
as good as the password protecting the UAV’s network in the
first place. Users with weak passwords that are extremely easy
to crack will be just as vulnerable as a UAV with no password
in the first place [15] [4] [16].
B. Port Security
Just because a UAV has WPA2 encryption implemented,
doesn’t mean that other security measures shouldn’t be taken.
One of the biggest factors affecting the efficiency of this test
is the management of ports on the UAV. During a flight, only
critical ports should be opened for use. Services like FTP, SSH,
and Telnet should all be restricted and require a second level of
authentication. The only ports that should be opened for use,
are those necessary for the flight of the UAV. With limited
port security on UAVs, this fuzzing test can flood multiple
ports at the same time and immediately distress the UAV.
IoT devices are just as vulnerable. Not accounting for every
access point on a device is what leads to vulnerabilities that
this novel fuzzing test exploits. Forcing a device to calculate
and respond to thousands of requests with no way to defend
itself. Port security is a necessity for all IoT devices. Without
port security, any service being run on an IoT device can be
manipulated, overwhelmed, exploited, and weakened. The fact
that many commercial UAVs and IoT devices don’t practice
port security is a major issue and is a reason for a multitude
of vulnerabilities being exploited.
1) Static vs. Dynamic Port Security: UAV’s may vary in
what features are provided or how well they are secured, but
port security can be fundamentally the same for all of them
[11] [9] [17]. A UAV may have hundreds, if not thousands, of
ports that it can use. For that reason, there are two methods
of maintaining port security. Static port security involves
closing all extraneous ports. The UAV only uses a specific
subset of ports with each port being used for exactly one
function or service. Whether it is broadcasting, sharing data, or
accepting input from the user, there is a port registered for each
operation. Securing each of these ports, rather than securing
every port on the UAV is much simpler and can avoid random
overflow attacks brought by flooding. This strategy begins to
show flaws when there are too many processes to handle. If a
UAV is providing a suite of services, then it can be difficult
to secure each port. The other problem is that the ports being
used for communication will be quickly found out by packet
sniffers. This information could lead to targeted attacks against
specific ports. The second option is dynamic port security.
Instead of having each service assigned to a unique port, have
the service communicate on multiple ports. The service will
switch what port to send and receive signals based on a specific
algorithm. The ports that aren’t being used will still be closed,
but now attackers can target only one port. The attacker will
have to attempt attacking multiple ports to get any results.
With such a tactic used, fuzzing and flooding attacks would be
much harder to launch on a large scale. If a swarm of UAVs
or IoT devices used dynamic port security, then a flooding
attack wouldn’t be able to affect the entire swarm. With each
device using a different port at what seems like random times,
it would be extremely arduous for an attacker to breach the
security of every, individual device.
C. Soft Limits
Port security can be taken one step further with soft limits.
Soft limits are rules programmed into a UAV or any IoT
device that detect whether a request sent from a node is valid.
On the Parrot Bebop 2, a soft limit was used for how large
a packet could be. Packets that went over this limit were
rejected to protect the UAV from overflow attacks. While this
method is a good start, more can be done on a software level.
One vulnerability that made the fuzzing test so successful
at eliminating GPS navigation was that the Parrot Bebop 2
had to understand the entire request before checking if it is
permissible. It would’ve been beneficial if the Parrot looked
at the specific keywords before computing what the rest of
the command. Searching for keywords would allow the UAV
to restrict commands that it knows aren’t allowed. The same
methodology could be applied to the arguments of commands
to check if they are inherently invalid and shouldn’t be fully
processed.
Soft limits can be employed for other purposes besides port
security as well. If UAV already knows that it is hosting
one user and receives another request to join its network,
soft limits would be able to automatically deny that request.
This combination of user management and soft limits would
allow UAVs to prevent a second user to gain access while
maintaining a strong connection with the original user. Soft
limits can also be used when managing IoT devices and how
they manage network traffic. IoT devices can add soft limits
to proficiently prevent fuzzing tests and other forms of attacks
from occurring. Creative implementations of soft limits in IoT
devices will prevent many overflow attacks and increase the
level of cybersecurity in the IoT world.
D. Adaptive Security
With many UAVs and IoT devices, the security protocols
and rules used remain constant all the time. While this isn’t
necessarily a bad thing, a UAV being able to recognize when
an overflow attack is occurring would be an extremely useful
security feature. If a UAV notices large amounts of data being
sent from the same user, the UAV could notify a trusted
user or pilot to give clarifying instructions to the UAV. If
the trusted user indicates to the UAV that the source of these
requests is unknown, the UAV can begin blocking all traffic
from the address. Having adaptive security measures in place
is a way to prevent many simplistic attacks that plague IoT
devices. [18] IoT devices could also be configured to trust only
certain IP addresses. Since UAVs configure users with static
IP addresses, this feature would be a simple addition to many
commercial UAVs and other IoT devices.
E. Necessity
The countermeasures listed above are crucial to defending
IoT devices from this fuzzing test. Adaptive security mea-
sures to identify suspicious behavior, soft limits to prevent
computing pointless requests, and managing access points
are all critical to UAV and IoT security. Without the proper
management and implementation of security protocols, more
vulnerabilities will be exploited to steal private information
and gain access to other restricted devices.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a novel attack involving the interruption of
GPS navigation through a fuzzing test has been shown. The
vulnerabilities in port security and anonymous FTP were both
exploited to interrupt GPS navigation on a Parrot Bebop 2.
The effects of fuzzing tests were discussed in terms of UAV
security and IoT security. Possible attacks that could stem
from this exploit were discussed, as well as countermeasures
that commercial UAVs could implement. Commercial UAVs
and other IoT devices were analyzed in great detail regarding
proper network security and potential risks users may face
when owning these devices. This novel attack further proves
how important the network security of UAVs is and how dire
of a need network security is for commercial UAVs.
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